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buyer's objections ;5 and right to adequate assurance of performance.5
Once a farmer is understood to be a merchant under the UCC, regarding
him as a mere "tiller of the soil" in other situations becomes difficult.
Consequently, doors once opened to the farmer as consumer rather than
businessman may now close.
53
III. CONCLUSION
As a result of the decision in Nelson v. Union Equity Co-Operative
Exchange, for all purposes relating to the transaction under the UCC, and
arguably for purposes extending beyond the UCC, the farmer who sells an
annual cash crop for his livelihood is a merchant. The decision stems from a
recognition by the court of the professional nature of the sale of a crop for a
living, and a finding that such a professional nature represents a knowledge
of goods and practices that parties contracting with the farmer are entitled to
rely upon. The holding balances the burdens on both the farmer and the
purchaser, concluding that requiring the increasingly sophisticated farmer to
read his mail and timely reject unsatisfactory proposals is minimal compared
to the burdens which would be imposed upon the market were a contrary
decision reached.
Mary Gallaspy Eads
Fifth Amendment Protection Against Gender-Based
Discrimination in the Distribution of Survivors'
Benefits: Califano v. Goldfarb
Mrs. Hannah Goldfarb paid all required social security taxes for twenty-
five years before her death in 1968. Her widower, Mr. Leon Goldfarb,
applied for survivors' benefits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(I)(D).' His
51. Id. § 2.605(a)(2).
52. Id. § 2.606(b).
53. For example, an Illinois appellate court in Meeker v. Fowler, 35 III. App. 3d 313, 341
N.E.2d 412, 417 (1976), implied that if a farmer is a merchant under the UCC, a sale to him
under a retail installment contract is invalid, being for a disallowed "commercial or business
use." The Texas retail installment sales provisions contain similar language. See TEx. REV.
CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-6.01(a) (Vernon 1971) (" '[g]oods' means all tangible personal
property when purchased primarily for personal, family or household use and not for commer-
cial or business use").
I. The Act provides:
The widower . . . of an individual who died a fully insured individual, [shall
receive benefits] if such widower-
(D)(i) was receiving at least one-half of his support. . . from such individual at
the time of her death, or, if such individual had a period of disability which did not
end prior to the month in which she died, at the time such period began or at the
time of her death, and filed proof of such support within two years after the date
of such death . . . , or
(ii) was receiving at least one-half of his support . . . from such individual at
the time she became entitled to old-age . . . insurance benefits . . . , and filed
proof of such support within two years after the month in which she became
entitled to such benefits . . ..
42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(1)(D) (1970).
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claim was denied for failure to meet the Act's requirement, applicable only
to widowers, that he be receiving at least one-half of his support from his
wife when she died. Mr. Goldfarb brought suit, 2 alleging the dependency
requirement to be an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection
guarantee of the fifth amendment due process clause 3 in that the Act allowed
survivors' benefits to be paid to a widow of a deceased husband covered by
the Act without a dependency test.4 A three-judge District Court for the
Eastern District of New York held that the differing treatment of female and
male wage earners embodied in the statute constituted invidious discrimina-
tion against female wage earners by affording them less protection for their
surviving spouses than is provided to male employees.5 Held, affirmed: The
dependency provision discriminates against female wage earners by requir-
ing them to pay social security taxes that afford less protection for their
spouses than results from equal payments by similarly situated male wage
earners and, hence, is violative of the equal protection guarantee of the fifth
amendment due process clause. Califano v. Goldfarb, 97 S. Ct. 1021, 51 L.
Ed. 2d 270 (1977).
1. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT'S APPLICATION
TO GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATION
The effectiveness of the equal protection guarantee as a tool to combat
gender-based discrimination has corresponded to the Court's choice of test
and accompanying level of scrutiny when determining whether or not there
has been a constitutional violation.' The Warren Court expanded the use of
the equal protection guarantee and developed the "two-tier" method of
analysis. 7 Legislation containing a classification which is deemed "sus-
pect" 8 or which affects an interest deemed "fundamental," 9 is subjected to
2. Mr. Goldfarb did not pursue an administrative appeal of the denial of his application
because such denial was based on a clear statutory requirement, rendering further administra-
tive action futile. The initial denial therefore was final for purposes of the district court's
jurisdiction under id. § 405(g).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... " An equal protection analysis under the fifth amendment is
substantially the same as that under the fourteenth amendment. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498
(1975); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973). See also Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
But see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 96 S. Ct. 1895, 1904, 48 L. Ed. 2d 495, 507 (1976), in
which Mr. Justice Stevens stated, "Although both Amendments require the same type of
analysis, . . . the two protections are not always coextensive. Not only does the language of
the two Amendments differ, but more importantly, there may be overriding national interests
which justify selective federal legislation that would be unacceptable for an individual state."
4. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1) (1970).
5. Goldfarb v. Secretary of HEW, 396 F. Supp. 308 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). The decision also
applied to 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(1)(C) (1970) which imposes a dependency requirement on hus-
bands of covered female wage earners applying for old-age benefits. Under id. § 402(b) wives
applying for such benefits are not required to prove dependency. 396 F. Supp. at 309.
6. See generally Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I
(1972); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of
Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REV. 945 (1975). See also Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
7. See Gunther, supra note 6, at 8.
8. Statutory classifications which are formally suspect are: race (see, e.g., Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)); alienage (see, e.g.,
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)); ancestry
(national origin) (see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
9. Fundamental interests include: The right to vote (see, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
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a test of strict judicial scrutiny. To withstand such examination legislation
must advance a compelling state interest obtainable only by the use of such
classification."0 Classifications not deemed suspect or affecting fundamental
rights are approved if they bear a rational relationship to a permissible state
objective.II Classifications rarely withstand strict scrutiny, and seldom fail
when judged under the rationality test. 2
The Burger Court has nominally adhered to the two-tier system of equal
protection review, 3 but its decisions reveal a mounting discontent with the
rigidity of the two-tier formula.' 4 In the area of sex classifications, the Court
has attempted to reach equitable results without far-reaching doctrinal con-
sequences.15 The Court has thus declined to make sex a suspect classifica-
tion; yet while purporting to apply rational-basis scrutiny the decisions
reveal it has instead utilized an unspecified level of heightened review. 6
In Reed v. Reed 7 the Court refused to find sex classifications suspect,
thereby rejecting the test of strict scrutiny. While purporting to follow the
traditional reasonableness test, however, the Court sustained the discrimi-
nation claim and required that such classifications "be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons
similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'
8
In Frontiero v. Richardson,9 a case in which administrative convenience
was the proffered justification for the gender-based classification, four
U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969)); the right to
interstate travel (see, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). But see Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (Court upheld a
requirement that party reside in state for one year before bringing divorce action against non-
resident)); the right to procreation (see, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)); the
right to freedom of association (see, e.g., Gibson v. Florida, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
10. See Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 951. There has been judicial restraint particularly in the
social and economic fields not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. See, e.g.,
New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. Ct. 2513, 49 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1976); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471 (1970); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
11. See Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 951.
12. See Gunther, supra note 6, at 8.
13. See Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 951.
14. Id. at 952; see Gunther, supra note 6, at 17. Mr. Justice Marshall, for example, favors a
"sliding scale" scrutiny, the rigor of which would vary with the importance of the interest
involved. See, e.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973)
(Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). For criticism of the two-tier approach see also Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451, 50 L.
Ed. 2d 397 (1976) (Powell and Stevens, JJ., concurring).
15. See Wilkinson, supra note 6, at 951.
16. Id. at 952; see Gunther, supra note 6, at 18.
17. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed a woman challenged a mandatory provision of the Idaho
Probate Code that gave preference to men over women when equally qualified persons applied
for an appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate.
18. Id. at 76 (emphasis added). The Court so held despite an apparently rational objective
of reducing the workload of the probate courts by eliminating one class of contests. See
Gunther, supra note 6, at 34.
19. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The challenged statute provided that a female member of the
armed services could receive a housing allowance and medical benefits for her husband only if
he was dependent on her for more than one-half of his support. Married male members of the




Justices 20 utilized strict scrutiny to strike the classification. Four others, 21
however, believed this unnecessary and held the classification would fail
under the test articulated in Reed. 2
2
With Reed and Frontiero, some observers concluded that the Court was
moving conservatively, in a fashion similar to its racial segregation cases,
towards a judgment that sex classifications were discriminatory and could
be justified only by a showing of a compelling state interest. 23 Any such
trend was halted in Kahn v. Shevin. 24 In Kahn the Court was confronted
with the problem of discrimination in favor of women; such discrimination
was termed "benign." A widower challenged a Florida provision granting
widows, but not widowers, a property tax exemption of five hundred dol-
lars. The plurality in Frontiero which had invoked strict scrutiny splin-
tered. 25 Mr. Justice Douglas in the majority opinion recited the fair and
substantial relation standard of Reed, 26 and concluded: "We deal here with a
state tax law reasonably designed to further the state policy of cushioning
the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for which that loss imposes
a disproportionately heavy burden. " 27 It has been observed, however, that
in the age and under the prevailing attitudes when this provision was passed,
this conclusion taxes credulity. 2 Further, Mr. Justice Brennan stated that if
the governmental objective was to reduce the disparity in economic condi-
tion between men and women caused by the long history of discrimination
against women, such an ameliorative purpose would be a compelling state
interest. 29 Consequently, after Kahn, if the legislation could be found
ameliorative, even hypothetically so, it would not violate the equal protec-
20. Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and White.
21. Mr. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stewart.
22. "It is unnecessary for the Court in this case to characterize sex as a suspect classifica-
tion, with all of the far-reaching implications of such a holding." 411 U.S. at 691-92; see note 15
supra and accompanying text. Additionally, Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Blackmun,
and Mr. Justice Powell preferred leaving the determination of whether to invoke strict judicial
scrutiny with the state legislatures who were debating the equal rights amendment. 411 U.S. at
692.
23. B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW,
CAUSES AND REMEDIES 123 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BABCOCK].
24. 416 U.S. 351 (1974). The challenged statute, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 196.191(7) (West 1971),
exempted from the state property tax "[piroperty to the value of five hundred dollars to every
widow and to every person who is a bona fide resident of the state and has lost a limb or has
been disabled in war or military hostilities or by misfortune."
25. BABCOCK, supra note 23, at 124; see note 20 supra and accompanying text.
26. 416 U.S. at 355.
27. Id.
28. The discrimination between surviving spouses originated in 1885. At that time women
were not even allowed to vote. In the context of the 19th century presumption that females
were inferior to males, attributing such an ameliorative purpose to the classification must be
regarded as a hypothetical rationalization. 97 S. Ct. at 1035, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 287 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). See Note, Preferential Economic Treatment for Women: Some Constitutional and
Practical Implications of Kahn v. Shevin, 28 VAND. L. REV. 843, 850 (1975). See also Erickson,
Kahn, Ballard, and Wiesenfeld: A New Equal Protection Test in "Reverse " Sex Discrimination
Cases?, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 14 (1975).
29. 416 U.S. at 358-59. Mr. Justice Brennan, however, found the statute overinclusive
since wealthy widows could benefit as well as poor ones, and thus dissented. The widow's
preference would have been accepted by Mr. Justice Brennan had there been an eligibility test.
Id. at 360. Mr. Justice Brennan's conception of what would constitute a compelling justification
for a sex classification is alarming. In effect, it substitutes discrimination against men for
discrimination against women rather than substituting individual treatment for overbroad sex
classification. See BABCOCK, supra note 23, at 124.
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tion guarantee.30
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld3T the Court developed a technique to avoid
Kahn and eroded portions of the decision without overruling it. The Kahn
ameliorative purpose argument as a means to withstand scrutiny was avoid-
ed by finding the relevant discrimination to be against women, therefore
precluding the possibility of the law's having an ameliorative purpose.32
Moreover, the Court required justification beyond "the mere recitation of a
benign, compensatory purpose" to uphold a sexually discriminatory stat-
ute. 33 Instead, the Court examined the articulated purpose as it emerged
from the statutory scheme itself and from the legislative history, and found
no actual ameliorative purpose.3 4
II. CALIFANO V. GOLDFARB
Califano v. Goldfarb35 presented a dependency test conditioning eligibility
for the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Benefits program, which was
applicable to widowers but not widows. As in Wiesenfeld,36 there was a
gender-based distinction for eligibility for social security benefits, and like
Frontiero,37 the challenged distinction was a dependency test. Mr. Justice
Brennan, joined by three other Justices,3" found the case to present an equal
30. See Erickson, supra note 28, at 10. The danger of Kahn is that it created the rationale
of remedying past discrimination as a constitutional justification for statutory sex classifica-
tions which, in the guise of benefiting women, actually discriminate against them. The Court
has been criticized because laws that purport to help women actually encourage the same sex
stereotypical thinking that perpetuates discrimination against women. Paternalism is no less
offensive than other more easily identifiable forms of sex discrimination. See BABCOCK, supra
note 23, at 124; Erickson, supra note 28, at 13; Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The
1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 6.
31. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). Stephen Wiesenfeld, a widower, was denied "Mother's insurance
benefits" under 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970) because that section authorized the payment to be
paid only to a "mother" who "has in her care a child of such [deceased] individual."
32. 420 U.S. at 645. See Erickson, supra note 28, at 36, 52. The focus of the Court thus
becomes crucial. If the statute is designed to compensate women for past discrimination, the
fact that it discriminates against men does not make it constitutionally defective. By finding
discrimination to be against women, the Court avoids any possible compensatory justification.
33. 420 U.S. at 648.
34. Id. The relative unanimity of the opinion in the case can be attributed to Mr. Justice
Brennan's exhaustive analysis of the statute's legislative history, convincing the Court that the
true purpose of the statute was to assure care for the child, not for the woman. The question
remained unanswered as to what level of scrutiny would apply when this element was missing.
Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Brennan did not invoke strict scrutiny, as he had advocated
in Frontiero and Kahn, but instead relied on the rationality approach of Reed. 420 U.S. at 653.
For a discussion of Kahn and the issue of reverse discrimination see generally Erickson, supra
note 28, at 10, 14-18; Ginsburg, supra note 30, at 6.
It was also argued that the statute did not discriminate against women employees because
social security is not a part of an employee's compensation as were the benefits in Frontiero,
but rather a social welfare measure designed to benefit the recipient in accordance with that
person's need. 420 U.S. at 646. The argument failed because although the right to social
security benefits is non-contractual, it "is directly related to years worked and amount earned
by a covered employee, and not to the need of the beneficiaries directly." 420 U.S. at 647(emphasis in original).
35. 97 S. Ct. 1021, 51 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1977).
36. See note 31 supra. The case was weaker than Wiesenfeld, however, because there was
no child involved. See note 34 supra. See also Erickson, note 28 supra, at 36, 43. The dissent
believed this distinguished Wiesenfeld. 97 S. Ct. at 1044, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 297. Additionally, in
Wiesenfeld there was an absolute exclusion of males, as opposed to the dependency test here.
Id. at 1038, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 290.
37. See note 19 supra. Five Justices distinguished Frontiero, however, because the bene-
fits were not a form of compensation for work done. 97 S. Ct. at 1032 n. 1, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 283
n.I (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 1044, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 298 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. Mr. Justice Marshall, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice White.
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protection question indistinguishable from Wiesenfeld39 and held that
Wiesenfeld and Frontiero plainly required affirmance of the judgment of
the district court." As the Court had reasoned in Wiesenfeld, the plurality
determined the authority of Kahn to be inapplicable by finding the relevant
discrimination to be against the covered wage-earning female, rather than
against the surviving widower. 41 The Kahn ameliorative policy argument
was that Congress may reasonably have presumed that nondependent
widows, who receive benefits, are needier than nondependent widowers,
who do not receive benefits, because of job discrimination against women. 42
This argument was rejected because, on the face of the statute, dependency
on the covered wage earner, not need, was found to be the central factor in
determining beneficiary categories. 43 Moreover, in the legislative history of
§ 402(f)(1)(D) there was no indication that Congress gave any attention to the
specific case of nondependent widows and found that they were in need of
benefits despite their lack of dependency, in order to compensate them for
disadvantages caused by sex discrimination."
The plurality thus concluded "the differential treatment of nondependent
widows and widowers results not . . . from a deliberate Congressional
intention to remedy the arguably greater needs of the former, but rather
from an intention to aid the dependent spouses of deceased wage earners,
coupled with a presumption that wives are usually dependent. 45 This was
held to be precisely the situation faced in Frontiero and Wiesenfeld4 6
Although recognizing that congressional decisions regarding non-contrac-
tual benefits were entitled to deference, 47 the plurality refused to immunize
social welfare legislation from equal protection scrutiny and held that "to
withstand constitutional challenge . . . classifications by gender must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives." 4 The plurality refused to accept as
justification for the gender-based discrimination an unverified assumption
that it would save the Government time, money, and effort simply to pay
benefits to all widows, rather than to require proof of dependency of both
sexes.
49
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, joined by three Justices in dissent,50 believed two
principles rendered the decision incorrect.5 1 First, the special characteristics
of the field of social insurance required the Court to give the classification
39. 97 S. Ct. at 1025, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 275.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1027, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 277; see note 32 supra and accompanying text.
42. 97 S. Ct. at 1029, 1036, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 280, 288; see note 30 supra and accompanying
text.
43. 97 S. Ct. at 1030, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 280.
44. Id. at 1030-32, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 280-83. The same type of analysis was used as in
Wiesenfeld. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
45. 97 S. Ct. at 1032, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 283.
46. d.
47. Id. at 1028, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 279; see notes 34, 37 supra.
48. 97 S. Ct. at 1029, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 279 (quoting Craig v. Boren, 97 S. Ct. 451,457, 50 L.
Ed. 2d 397, 407 (1976)).
49. Id. at 1032, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 283.
50. Mr. Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Stewart.
51. 97 S. Ct. at 1036, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 288.
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special consideration. 2 He emphasized that piecemeal development of the
statutory scheme comprising the field of social insurance precluded mathe-
matical precision in the distribution of benefits.5 3 Moreover, because of
congressional concern for certainty in the determination of entitlement and
for promptness in payment of benefits, administrative convenience was
especially important.54
Additionally, by characterizing the classification as one favoring widows,
the dissent relied on the authority of Kahn.5 5 The dissent believed the
statutory treatment of widows and widowers reflected legislative judgments
that persons qualifying for spousal benefits are likely to have more substan-
tial needs after the passing of a spouse; and that widows are much more
likely to be without adequate means of support than widowers.5 6 Thus, the
classification was held to be over-inclusive and not exclusionary.5 1 Such a
defect was believed reasonably justified on the basis of available empirical
data, 58 the relative importance of administrative convenience,5 9 and the
ameliorative purpose of the legislationA0
Mr. Justice Stevens, concurring, agreed with the dissent that the relevant
discrimination was against the surviving male spouses, rather than the
deceased female wage earners. 6' He believed, however, that the ameliora-
tive purpose rationale set forth in Kahn was the type of hypothetical
justification which was later rejected in Wiesenfeld.62 He then concluded
that the dissent's administrative convenience rationale and ameliorative
policy argument were but hypothetical justifications and thereby insuffi-
cient to withstand equal protection scrutiny. 63
III. CONCLUSION
Since Reed the Burger Court has struggled to find a level of equal protec-
tion scrutiny for gender-based discrimination. In Califano v. Goldfarb the
Court avoided an ameliorative purpose argument as justification for a gen-
der-based classification by finding the relevant discrimination to be against a
wage-earning female. The Court further required that any such ameliorative
purpose be articulated and discernible from the statutory scheme and legis-
lative history. A heightened level of scrutiny was then used, and the statu-
tory classification rejected. Although reaching the proper conclusion, by
failing to overrule Kahn the Court must continue the awkward task of
52. Id.; see notes 34, 37 supra. The dissent particularly relied on Mathews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495 (1976), and Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975), in which the Court refused to
extend into the field of social security law constitutional proscriptions against distinctions
based on illegitimacy and irrebuttable presumptions. 97 S. Ct. at 1038, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 290-91.
53. 97 S. Ct. at 1038-39, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 291.
54. Id. at 1036, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 288; see text accompanying note 49 supra.
55. 97 S. Ct. at 1036, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 288; see note 30 supra and accompanying text.
56. 97 S. Ct. at 1040-41, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 293-94.
57. Id. at 1044, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 298.
58. Id. at 1045, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 298.
59. Id.
60. Id., 51 L. Ed. 2d at 298-99.
61. Id. at 1032, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 283.
62. Id. at 1035-36, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 287.
63. Id. at 1033-35, 51 L. Ed. 2d at 284-87.
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